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STATE OF UTAH, ] 
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vs. ) 
JASON B. PARKIN, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) APPELLANTS' REPLY 
1 BRIEF 
) Case No. 20060530-CA 
ARGUMENT 
I. SPENCER'S SEIZURE OF MR. PARKIN VIOLATED ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION; 
THEREFOR ALL EVIDENCE OBTAINED AS A RESULT OF THE 
ILLEGAL SEIZURE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED. 
A. Mr. Parkin was unlawfully seized where Trooper Spencer lacked the 
requisite reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond the consensual 
encounter. 
Mr. Parkin argued in his opening brief that the trial court erred in denying his Motion 
to Suppress, specifically because his consent was not voluntary and tainted by the prior police 
illegality. In response, the State argued that Mr. Parkin abandoned his trial claim that he was 
unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. To the contrary, Mr. Parkin has not 
abandoned his Fourth Amendment claim. Mr. Parkin indeed, for all purposes, has asserted 
and continues to assert his Fourth Amendment claims, and further emphasizes the flagrant 
and illegal police conduct inherent in his Fourth Amendment claims by establishing that he 
was also in custody for Fifth Amendment Miranda purposes, and that police misconduct 
violated that right. 
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution protects "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . 
. . against unreasonable searches and seizures." Utah Const. Art. I § 14; U.S. Const, amend. 
IV. "It is axiomatic that the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
embodied in the Utah and United States Constitution is one of the most cherished rights we 
possess." State v. Trane, 57P.3d 1052,1057 (Utah 2002). Based upon these constitutional 
protections, the scope of an officer's authority to conduct an unreasonable search and seizure 
of an individual is restricted. 
It is well established that there are three different levels of citizen encounters with 
law enforcement officials; each requiring a different degree of justification under the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 12 (Utah App. 1991). A level one citizen 
encounter occurs when an official encounters a citizen who voluntarily responds to non-
coercive questioning. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994). An officer 
may seize a person at a level two encounter if the officer has reasonable articulable 
suspicion that that person has committed a serious crime or is about to commit a crime. 
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Id. And a level three encounter occurs when an officer has arrested an individual based 
on probable cause that an offense has been or is being committed. Id. 
A level one encounter does not constitute a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment because it is consensual and an individual is not detained against his 
will. Id. However, a level two encounter rises to a seizure within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment where a reasonable person based on the totality of the circumstances 
does not feel free to leave. Id. In order to justify such a seizure, an officer's suspicion 
must be supported by "specific and articulable facts and rational inferences." State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996). Additionally, the detention cannot be based 
on an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion" or a mere hunch. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868(1968). 
The initial encounter between Spencer and Mr. Parkin was consensual in nature 
because Spencer was called to the scene to investigate an accident. However, the 
consensual encounter ended as soon as Spencer concluded the accident investigation. 
(SH:19). Thus, when Spencer began questioning Mr. Parkin about the odor of marijuana 
and marijuana use, the level once encounter escalated into a level two seizure. 
(SH: 19,21). It was a seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 
because a reasonable person in Mr. Parkin's position would not have felt free to leave at 
anytime. Additionally, Spencer's seizure of Mr. Parkin was unlawful because it was not 
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion, but instead based on mere suspicion. 
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In State v. Hechtle, 89 P.3d 185, 191 (Utah App. 2004), this Court did not find 
probable cause based on the following facts: the defendant's eyes were red and glossy, the 
presence of multiple air fresheners, and the defendant's tongue was "very green" with 
bumps on the back of it." This Court found that the Trooper's "mere suspicion" that the 
defendant "had at some point in the past, ingested marijuana" was insufficient to support 
that the trooper had probable cause to arrest the defendant. Id. While Hechtle required 
probable cause, and this case requires reasonable articulable suspicion, the same totality 
of circumstances approach required for probable cause is used to determine if there are 
"specific articulable facts" to support reasonable suspicion. See City of St. George v. 
Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). 
In this case, the trial court erred in finding that Spencer had reasonable suspicion 
to justify the seizure, and in finding that Mr. Parkin's statement that his friends had 
smoked marijuana was some corroboration of the odor. (R.85-86). Under the totality of 
the circumstances test Spencer did not have reasonable suspicion to seize Mr. Parkin 
based on the odor of marijuana. Other than the odor, Spencer did not observe any other 
indicia of marijuana use. Spencer observed Mr. Parkin for over thirty minutes and did not 
believe he was impaired. (SH:37). He also observed that Mr. Parkin did not have glassy, 
blood shot eyes or appear to be slurring his words. Id. Thus, Spencer only had a mere 
suspicion that Mr. Parkin had recently used marijuana based on the odor. 
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The State argues that "Trooper Spencer's question about marijuana suggested that 
there may be an innocent explanation for the marijuana odor." Appellee's Brief at 9. 
However, that belief cannot be reconciled with Spencer's testimony that "Anytime I smell 
marijuana, I search the car." (SH:39). Moreover, if Spencer had interrogated Mr. Parkin 
about the odor of marijuana under the belief that he might obtain an innocent explanation, 
he would have been satisfied with Mr. Parkin's response that "he does have friends that 
smoke marijuana" but that he had not smoked any. (SH:20,35). Spencer would not have 
continued to request a search of Mr. Parkin's vehicle just to "make sure there wasn't any 
marijuana" in it. (SH:36). Furthermore, Mr. Parkin's statement provides no 
corroboration that marijuana was in his vehicle. Therefore, Mr. Parkin's seizure was 
unlawful because the odor alone was not sufficient articulable reasonable suspicion and 
there was no corroborating evidence. 
B. Because Mr. Parkin was illegally seized, any subsequent consent to 
search was both involuntary and invalid because it was tainted by 
the prior illegality. 
In the absence of a warrant, when a defendant is illegally seized, and his or her 
rights are violated, for the subsequent search to be valid the State must prove that the 
consent to search was (1) voluntary and (2) there was no police exploitation of a prior 
illegality. State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990); see also State v. Hansen, 63 
P.3d 650 (Utah 2002)(setting forth the multiple prong test for voluntariness of consent). 
In its response brief the State argues that the trial court correctly concluded that Mr. 
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Parkin's consent was freely and voluntarily given. It bases its argument on the following: 
Spencer "did not claim authority to search the car" and "he did not draw his weapon or 
make a show of force". App. Brf. at 8. Even though Spencer did not verbally articulate a 
right to search the car, he showed a claim of authority by accusing Mr. Parkin of smoking 
marijuana and possessing it in his vehicle. (SH:36). He particularly showed authority to 
search by asking if he could "make sure there wasn't any marijuana" in it. (SH:36). Even 
the trial court found that "Spencer stated by his question he believed drugs were in the 
vehicle." (R. 86). 
Moreover, Spencer used deception to obtain Mr. Parkin's consent. Spencer knew 
he was going to search the car from his initial contact with Mr. Parkin. This is evidenced 
by his testimony that he always searches vehicles if he smells marijuana. (SH:36). 
Everything he did leading up to the point of obtaining consent was a deceitful way to 
obtain Mr. Parkin's consent. For example, Spencer did not question Mr. Parkin about the 
odor when he first noticed it, he took care of the culpable parties citation first, he required 
Mr. Parkin to sit in his patrol car to obtain the necessary paperwork (he did not request 
the other party to sit in his patrol car), he handed Mr. Parkin his papers and then 
immediately questioned him and he did not inform Mr. Parkin that he was free to leave 
and that he did not have to consent. (SH:12-36). 
In its response brief the State also claims that Spencer's request was not coercive. 
App. Brf. at 9. However, Spencer's coercive tactic was well developed in Mr. Parkin's 
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opening brief under his Miranda argument. In sum, Spencer's questioning was coercive 
because he asked accusatory questions while inside of a patrol car, when he did not get 
the desired answer he continued to question Mr. Parkin, after Mr. Parkin denied smoking 
marijuana Spencer requested to search his car to make sure there wasn't any marijuana. 
Based on the totality of the circumstances Mr. Parkin's consent was not freely and 
voluntarily given, and in any event, while consent is a factual finding, voluntariness is a 
legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 
1272 (Utah 1993). Further, in the event consent is determined to be voluntary, then the 
second prong of the voluntariness test as articulated and used in State v. Hansen, must be 
used to determine whether the consent was valid. 63 P.3d 650. The trial court did not 
address the required second prong test. 
The second prong "Exploitation Analysis" as articulated under Hansen, requires 
the trial court to focus on the relationship between "official misconduct and subsequently 
discovered evidence to determine if excluding evidence will effectively deter future 
illegalities." Id. The United States Supreme Court has noted that the exploitation 
analysis has three factors that have particular relevance in determining validity of consent, 
to wit: (1) the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct; (2) the presence of 
intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal proximity between the illegal detention 
and consent. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). 
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The aforementioned factors weigh in favor of a finding that the police illegality 
tainted and rendered invalid any consent to search that Mr. Parkin may have given. First, 
the temporal proximity between the illegality and the consent was immediate. His 
consent was simultaneous with his illegal detention. Secondly, there were no intervening 
circumstances that occurred between the illegal detention and Mr. Parkin's consent. 
Spencer requested consent to search Mr. Parkin's car while he was still being illegally 
detained. Finally, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct was severe. 
Spencer observed Mr. Parkin for thirty minutes without noticing any indications of 
impairment or criminal activity. (SH:37). He was not even cited for the accident that 
invited Spencer's presence. (SH:17-18). Despite making no observations of criminal 
activity other than the odor of marijuana, Spencer required Mr. Parkin to sit in his patrol 
car where he proceeded to question him. (SH: 18-19). Finally, when Mr. Parkin stated 
that he has friends that smoke Spencer should have let him on his way. Instead, Spencer 
continued to pursue his hunch that there was marijuana in the car by requesting consent. 
Because Mr. Parkin's consent to search his care was both involuntary and tainted by the 
prior illegality, any evidence obtained as a result of the search should a have been 
suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree." 
The "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine introduced in Wong Sun v. U.S., 371 
U.S. 471, 488 (1963) stated that a trial court must determine "whether, granting 
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made 
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has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently 
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." When conducting these analyses, a 
court should determine whether excluding such evidence will effectively deter future 
illegalities. See State v. Hansen, 63 P.3d at 665 (citing State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 
289,292 (Utah 1995). The exclusionary rule is judicially created to safeguard individuals 
against Fourth Amendment violations. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 10(1995). The 
United States Supreme Court extended the exclusionary rule to apply to all state criminal 
proceedings by holding that "all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation 
of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court." Mapp v. 
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). The Supreme Court of Utah, in State v. Larocco adopted 
the federal exclusionary rule as a state rule, holding that the "exclusion of illegally 
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article 1 section 14." 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) (no longer good law for a different point 
of law). 
In the instant case, the exclusionary rule should have been applied to all 
evidence against Mr. Parkin as it is "fruit of the poisonous tree." Police exploitation 
existed in the instant case because there were no intervening factors. The evidence 
obtained by Spencer occurred during his purposeful and flagrant official misconduct. 
Spencer decided to ignore Mr. Parkin's constitutional rights when he illegally seized him, 
and perpetuated the taint when he coerced Mr. Parkin into consenting to the search of his 
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vehicle. The exclusionary rule was created to prohibit this type of conscious disregard of 
a constitutional guaranty by an officer. 
Furthermore, the trial courts failure to exclude the evidence in this case does not 
prohibit an officer from seizing anyone he or she suspects to have recently ingested 
marijuana based on the odor and then coerce them into giving up any evidence, even if 
the seizure was unsupported by reasonable articulable suspicion. Thus, all incentives for 
officers to obtain reasonable articulable suspicion will be removed. Accordingly, because 
all evidence obtained by Spencer was a direct exploitation of Mr. Parkin's illegal seizure 
it should have been excluded as tainted by the illegal seizure. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, and on the facts and argument 
presented in his opening brief, Mr. Parkin requests this Court to reverse his conviction. 
Or in the alternative, asks this Court to find that the trial court erred in denying his 
Motion to Suppress and remand the case to the district court. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5th day of April, 2007. 
BRENT GOLD 
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